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Abstract
Rapid and effective detection and identification of emerging microbiological threats and potential biowarfare agents is very
challenging when using traditional culture-based methods. Contemporary molecular techniques, relying upon reverse
transcription and/or polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR/PCR) provide a rapid and effective alternative, however, such assays
are generally designed and optimized to detect only a limited number of targets, and seldom are capable of differentiation
among variants of detected targets. To meet these challenges, we have designed a broad-range resequencing pathogen
microarray (RPM) for detection of tropical and emerging infectious agents (TEI) including biothreat agents: RPM-TEI v 1.0
(RPM-TEI). The scope of the RPM-TEI assay enables detection and differential identification of 84 types of pathogens and 13
toxin genes, including most of the class A, B and C select agents as defined by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC, Atlanta, GA). Due to the high risks associated with handling these particular target pathogens, the
sensitivity validation of the RPM-TEI has been performed using an innovative approach, in which synthetic DNA fragments
are used as templates for testing the assay’s limit of detection (LOD). Assay specificity and sensitivity was subsequently
confirmed by testing with full-length genomic nucleic acids of selected agents. The LOD for a majority of the agents
detected by RPM-TEI was determined to be at least 10
4 copies per test. Our results also show that the RPM-TEI assay not
only detects and identifies agents, but is also able to differentiate near neighbors of the same agent types, such as closely
related strains of filoviruses of the Ebola Zaire group, or the Machupo and Lassa arenaviruses. Furthermore, each RPM-TEI
assay results in specimen-specific agent gene sequence information that can be used to assess pathogenicity, mutations,
and virulence markers, results that are not generally available from multiplexed RT-PCR/PCR-based detection assays.
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Introduction
Deliberate release of a virulent biological agent in a densely
populated area can have devastating effects. Early detection of an
attack that uses biowarfare agents is extremely difficult, in part
because diagnosis may be confounded by nonspecific ‘‘flu-like’’
initial symptoms [1,2], coupled with very small a priori likelihood
of such exposures and etiologies of infection. Rapid and effective
methods for accurate and sensitive detection of biothreat agents
are critical elements for national security. Traditional methods of
identification of infectious agents based on culture, although
reliable and familiar, are too slow to be relevant in the case of an
intentional release of a biological agent. Additionally the safety
considerations limit culture-based assays for those agents to a few
facilities that are able to assure safety and containment of such
agents. The fact that a significant proportion of microorganisms
are not amenable to culture [3] is another serious drawback of
those techniques. Finally, one of the most significant challenges to
the successful detection of biowarfare agents is their diversity.
Potential biothreat agents can be found across a number of
bacterial and viral taxonomic groups [4]. Furthermore, many
biothreat agents are very similar to relatively harmless species
[5,6]. An ability to distinguish innocuous genetic near-neighbors
from biothreat agents would lower the false alarm rate, which is
crucial in risk management, and successful public health
response.
Molecular methods such as RT-PCR/PCR may provide rapid
identification based on the direct detection of bacteria and viruses
in clinical or environmental samples, and thus address the issues of
speed of assay. However, most current detection technologies in
use are optimized for the detection of a single or a limited number
of pathogens. In general such assays rely upon short nucleic acid
sequence signature elements to detect and identify the specific
targets of each assay. This rationale imposes a contradictory
challenge to optimize assay specificity (minimize false positive
results) and sensitivity (minimize false negative results).
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6569There are a number of attempts under way to develop
technologies for broad-spectrum detection of infectious agents for
clinical as well as biodefense applications [7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15].
Onepromising technologyistheresequencingpathogenmicroarray
(RPM). A number of recent studies using RPM technology have
shown that it allows simultaneous detection of a large number of
targeted infectious agents, retaining high specificity and clinically
relevant sensitivity at a relatively modest cost [16,17,18,19]. In
addition, the architecture of resequencing microarrays allows for
detection and identification of natural or engineered sequence
variations of targeted agents. Sequences differing up to 15 percent
from the prototype sequence on the chip can be reliably detected
[20] and the resolution of individual bases allows for strain
discrimination and detection of novel sequence variants [21]. A
prototype resequencing pathogen microarray version 1 (RPM v.1)
was designed and studied in our laboratory, primarily for detection
of common respiratory pathogens plus six CDC category A
biothreat agents [17]. It was demonstrated that RPM v.1 was able
to identify intended targets and differentiate them from near
neighbor species [22]. Building upon this experience, this paper
describes the results for a new microarray design that covers a much
broader range of potential biowarfare agents. This new microarray
contains targets intended for detection of the majority of CDC
category A, B and C select agents and a number of toxin genes.
While designing the multiple-pathogen microarray and its
amplification protocol are critical tasks, collecting material for
validating the multi-pathogen microarray is just as important and
challenging. This is particularly true in the case of a microarray
intended to detect biothreat agents, since the majority of its targets
are not only classified as ‘‘select agents’’ but also potentially lethal.
Such agents require handling in facilities with biosafety level
ratings BSL-3 or BSL-4. For some agents such as Bacillus anthracis
or Yersinia pestis, it is possible to obtain nucleic acids, avirulent
strains or inactive organisms. However for the majority of agents
required to validate the microarray, access even to their genomic
nucleic acids is limited to specialized high security laboratories. To
overcome this limitation, we developed an innovative validation
strategy, which takes advantage of synthetic gene templates to
establish the limit of detection (LOD), for every target on the
microarray for which genomic templates are not available.
Although synthetic DNA is routinely used in many areas of
biomedical research and examples of application of synthetic
templates for diagnostic assay validation [12,23,24] as well as
attempts to create multivalent synthetic test templates [25,26] can
be found in scientific literature, this is the first report of a large
scale validation strategy based primarily on synthetic genes. The
results of this study show that by applying this strategy it is possible
to develop and fine-tune the amplification protocol of the
microarray to achieve target LOD. This validation is not a
complete clinical validation which is expensive and difficult to
implement but a ‘‘sensitivity’’ validation which ensures that the
developed microarray and protocol is likely to perform well for
clinical use. Retrospective testing of some targets using genomic
templates demonstrated concordant results to those observed using
synthetic templates. This study demonstrates that synthetic
templates are suitable alternatives for the validation of multiple-
pathogen microarrays and establishing LOD.
Materials and Methods
RPM-TEI chip design
The RPM-TEI arrays (TessArray
H RPM-TEI 1.0, TessArae
LLC, Potomac Falls, VA) were designed to maximize detection
coverage of CDC category A, B, and C biothreat agents. A total of
187 diagnostic sequences from 84 pathogens (including their
subtypes) were selected and used to create RPM-TEI, which
allows resequencing of 117 kb (see supporting materials: Table S1
and Figure S1).
The design and target selection strategy used is described in
detail in previous studies [20,27] but has incorporated an
expanded pre-processing step for highly variable organisms
(Figure 1). The purpose of this step is to simplify the process of
diagnostic sequence selection by defining subgroups of related
sequences within a large set of sequences for particular target.
Then each of those smaller groups is analyzed separately to find
the minimum number of probes necessary to detect all of the
sequences using a previously developed methodology.
The pre-processing is done by analyzing all the available
sequences for a particular target in an organism that are available
in GenBank. The sequences are downloaded, trimmed to the
same length, and used to construct a phylogenetic tree. Finally the
sequences on closely related branches of the tree are compared to
define clusters with .90% of sequence identity. A single prototype
detector sequence is initially selected from each cluster with the
assumption that it will be able to detect all of the sequences in the
cluster, since previous studies have demonstrated that RPM assays
can reliably detect target sequences with as much as 15%
variation [20].
Figure 1. Selection of detector sequences used in RPM-TEI
design. The diagram illustrates the main stages of the detector
sequence selection process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006569.g001
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to verify complete coverage of the cluster and select additional
probes if required to ensure full coverage. For a detailed example,
the procedure used to select probes for Lassa viruses is described in
supporting methods Text S1.
Primer selection
To simplify primer design and multiplex PCR optimization,
four independent multiplex primer cocktails were developed for
amplification of 187 targeted sequences represented on RPM-TEI
array. The gene-specific primer pairs for all targets on the RPM-
TEI chips (supporting Table S1) were designed according to the
criteria described previously [18,19]. Of the four multiplex primer
mixes, mix I was dedicated primarily to bacterial targets and a few
DNA viruses. Two primer mixes were designed to amplify mostly
hemorrhagic fever viruses; mix II for those mainly endemic in
Africa and Australia and III for those endemic in the Americas
and additionally included Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
virus. The mix IV provides amplification of confounders and other
agents. For list of agents included in each PCR group, see
supporting Table S2.
Multiplex RT-PCR Amplification
The multiplex reverse transcription (RT)-PCR amplification
reactions were performed under conditions that have been pre-
viously described [18,20]. The RT reaction products were
subdivided for four different multiplex PCR amplification reactions.
The amplified products from all four PCR reactions were combined
again into a single sample and subjected to purification and
processing prior to hybridizing to the RPM-TEI chips.
Strains and templates
Control reference strains and field strains used to test the
sensitivity and specificity of RPM-TEI and their sources are listed
in Table 1. Since most of the agents that RPM-TEI was designed
to detect required BSL-3 or BSL-4 facilities for safe handling, they
were substituted for analytic sensitivity testing by synthetic DNA
fragments manufactured by BlueHeron Biotechnology, Inc.,
Bothell, WA (see supporting Table S3 for a complete list). Viral
strains tested with RPM-TEI at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID, Frederick,
MD) are listed in Table 2.
Nucleic acid extraction
For bacteria and viruses, which were rated for handling in BSL-
2 environment or higher rated, inactivated organisms, genomic
DNA was extracted in NRL using the MasterPure DNA
purification kit (Epicentre Technologies, Madison, WI) according
to manufacturer’s recommendations.
For some agents, which required BSL-3 facilities, bacterial
genomic DNA was kindly provided by Dr. Ted Hadfield from Air
Force Institute of Pathology (AFIP), Washington, DC.
Viral RNA was extracted using TRIzol LS (Invitrogen,
Carlsbad, CA) at USAMRIID according to manufacturer’s
recommended protocol. The final pellet of product RNA was
resuspended using 100 ml of RNase free water (Ambion, Austin,
TX) and incubated at 65uC for 5 min.
Quantification of nucleic acids
Bacterial genomic DNA preparations were quantified using
NanoDrop ND1000 (Thermo Scientific Inc., Waltham, MA)
spectrophotometer and genome copy number was calculated using
the genome size and the DNA concentration. Viral DNA and RNA
preparations, which also contained nucleic acids from cell culture,
were subjected to quantitative real-time reverse transcription (RT)-
PCR/PCR against concentration standards of the virus to
determine the copy number of the viral templates. In some cases
where standards were unavailable, the concentration of the virus
was expressed in plaque forming units (pfu). For synthetic DNA
templates,theDNAconcentrationwasused tocalculatethenumber
of copies of the template based on the size of the DNA fragments.
Chip processing and automatic sequence based
identification
Microarray hybridization and processing, image scanning and
processing were performed as previously described [18]. Gene-
Chip Analysis Software v. 4.0 (Affymetrix, Santa Clara, CA) was
used to produce FASTA output files. Final pathogen identification
was performed using Computer-Implemented Biological Sequence
Identifier (CIBSI) Version 2.0 software [28], an automatic
pathogen identification algorithm based on nucleic acid sequence
alignment, which was developed and tested in detail in previous
studies [18,19]. The NCBI BLAST and taxonomy databases used
for CIBSI analysis were downloaded in October 2008. Due to the
fact that sequence databases used by CIBSI are redundant and the
nature of the available taxonomy database, the automated
identifications made by this software were usually limited to the
species level unless only a single sequence was the best scoring
match. To achieve strain level discrimination when multiple
sequences had the same best scoring match, the results were
reviewed to determine if these sequences were in fact redundant
and represented the same strain.
Table 1. Pathogens used as a source of nucleic acids for
microarray validation.
Pathogen Strain Form Source
1
Cryptosporidium parvum TU502 Nucleic acid NRL
Bacillus anthracis Ames Nucleic acid AFIP
Bacillus cereus ATCC 14579 Live cells ATCC
Bartonella quintana ATCC 51694 Live cells ATCC
Campylobacter jejuni ATCC 700819D-5 Live cells ATCC
Clostridium perfringens ATCC 13124 Live cells ATCC
Clostridium tetani ATCC 9441 Live cells ATCC
Escherichia coli O157:H7 ATCC 43985
(CDC EDL933)
Nucleic acid ATCC
Francisella tularensis SHU4 Nucleic acid AFIP
Leptospira interrogans ATCC 23478 Live cells ATCC
Mycobacterium tuberculosis ATCC 25177 Attenuated cells ATCC
Salmonella enterica ATCC 19430 Live cells ATCC
Vibrio cholerae ATCC 513940 Nucleic acid ATCC
Yersinia pestis D27 Nucleic acid AFIP
Dengue type 2 ATCC VR-345 Live virus ATCC
Dengue type 3 ATCC VR-1256 Live virus ATCC
Dengue type 4 ATCC VR-1257 Live virus ATCC
Human herpesvirus 1 ATCC VR-1493 Live virus ATCC
Human herpesvirus 2 ATCC VR-734 Live virus ATCC
Influenza A virus (H5N1) CDC influenza A/H5N1 Live virus CDC
1NRL=Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC; ATCC=American Type
Culture Collection, Manassas, VA; AFIP=Armed Forces Institute of Pathology,
Washington, DC.; CDC=Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, GA.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006569.t001
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Amplification-Primer Cocktail Optimization
As shown in Figure 2, the first step of the validation process was
optimization ofprimers andprimermixes for specific genetargets on
the chip. First, it was determined which targets will be amplified
together, thus dictating which primer pairs end up in the same
multiplex PCR mixture based on the criteria described in the
methods section. In the next steps, a software script based on a
selection algorithm developed by our group [29] was used to select
primers from defined primer regions of each target based on criteria
definedinpreviousstudies[18].Alinkersequencewasadded to each
primer in a cocktail and all of them were checked against each other
for potential primer dimer interactions with FastPCR Professional
v.5.2.71 (Primer Digital Ltd., http://www.biocenter.helsinki.fi/bi/
Programs/fastpcr.htm, Helsinki, Finland). These processes were
repeated until elimination of all primers having stretches of 8 bp or
more matching with other primers in the same cocktail.
Table 2. Results of testing of the RPM-TEI using genomic preparations of selected viral agents.
Pathogen Taxon PCR group Concentration Identification result
Ebola Zaı ¨re Filoviridae II 1 ng Zaı ¨re Ebola virus strain Zaı ¨re 1995
Ebola Zaı ¨re Filoviridae II 10
21 ng Zaı ¨re Ebola virus strain Zaı ¨re 1995
Ebola Zaı ¨re Filoviridae II 10
22 ng Zaı ¨re Ebola virus strain Zaı ¨re 1995
Ebola Zaı ¨re Filoviridae II 10
23 ng Zaı ¨re Ebola virus strain Zaı ¨re 1995
Ebola Zaı ¨re Filoviridae II 10
24 ng Zaı ¨re Ebola virus strain Zaı ¨re 1995
Ebola Zaı ¨re Filoviridae II 10
25 ng No detection
Ebola Reston Filoviridae II 1 ng Reston Ebola virus strain Pennsylvania
Ebola Reston Filoviridae II 10
21 ng Reston Ebola virus strain Pennsylvania
Ebola Reston Filoviridae II 10
22 ng Reston Ebola virus strain Pennsylvania
Ebola Reston Filoviridae II 10
23 ng Reston Ebola virus strain Pennsylvania
Ebola Ivory Coast Filoviridae II 10
21 ng Cote ˆ d’Ivoire Ebola virus
Ebola Zaı ¨re strain Mayinga Filoviridae II 10
21 ng Zaı ¨re Ebola virus strain Mayinga
Marburg Ravn Filoviridae II 10
21 ng Lake Victoria Marburg virus strain Ravn
Marburg Musoke Filoviridae II 10
21 ng No detection
Marburg Ci67 Filoviridae II 10
21 ng Lake Victoria Marburg virus strain Ci67
Lassa Josiah Arenaviridae II 1 ng Lassa virus strain Josiah
Lassa Josiah Arenaviridae II 10
21 ng Lassa virus strain Josiah
Lassa Josiah Arenaviridae II 10
22 ng Lassa virus strain Josiah
Lassa Josiah Arenaviridae II 10
23 ng No detection
Lassa Z148 Arenaviridae II 1 ng Lassa virus strain Z148
Lassa Z148 Arenaviridae II 10
21 ng Lassa virus strain Z148
Lassa Z148 Arenaviridae II 10
22 ng Lassa virus strain Z148
Lassa Z148 Arenaviridae II 10
23 ng Lassa virus strain Z148
Lassa Acar Arenaviridae II 10
21 ng No detection
Lassa Weller Arenaviridae II 10
21 ng Lassa virus strain Weller
Lassa Pinneo Arenaviridae II 10
21 ng Lassa virus strain Pinneo or Acar
Machupo Carvallo Arenaviridae III 10
21 ng Machupo virus strain Carvallo
Machupo Chicava Arenaviridae III 10
21 ng Machupo virus strain Chicava
Guanarito INH95551 Arenaviridae III 10
21 ng Guanarito virus strain INH-95551
Junin Rumero Arenaviridae III 10
21 ng Junin virus strain Rumero
CCHFV
1 10200 Bunyaviridae III 10
21 ng CCHFV strain IbAr10200
Rift Valley fever Bunyaviridae II 10
21 ng Rift Valley fever virus
Sandfly Sicilian Bunyaviridae IV 10
21 ng No detection
Sandfly Naples Bunyaviridae IV 10
21 ng Sandfly Naples strain NAMRU 840055
Toscana Bunyaviridae IV 10
21 ng Toscana virus
Punta Toro Bunyaviridae IV 10
21 ng No detection
Seoul Bunyaviridae IV 10
21 ng Seoul virus
Hantaan Bunyaviridae IV 10
21 ng No detection
Puumala Bunyaviridae N/A 10
21 ng No detection
Sin nombre Bunyaviridae III 10
21 ng Pulmonary syndrome hantavirus strain Convict Creek 107
1CCHFV=Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006569.t002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6569Figure 2. Procedure of optimization of primer cocktails. The diagram illustrates the procedure used to optimize the compositions of primer
cocktails used for target amplification. The procedure consists of two stages. First stage was conducted using software for analysis of primer
interactions and the second stage was carried out in vitro by testing of the performance of cocktails in multiplex PCR reactions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006569.g002
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vitro (Figure 2). All the primer pairs were tested individually with
their corresponding targets. Any primer pairs that failed to amplify
the targets were replaced. Next, the efficiency of complete cocktails
was tested. In order to simulate the conditions that may occur in
real samples, testing was conducted, in most cases, using mixtures
of two to five different templates per reaction. Template
composition of test samples for each PCR group is summarized
in supporting Table S4. To avoid unnecessary cost, the initial
testing of cocktails was conducted without using microarrays. The
test samples with templates in concentration of 1 ng each per
sample were amplified using multiplex PCR with the appropriate
primer cocktails. The resulting products were purified and
subjected to second stage individual specific PCR for each
template present in the sample and analyzed on agarose gel.
Previous experience has indicated that if primers for a particular
target are efficient enough to amplify specific products in quantity
that is detectable on a gel then in most cases detection on
microarray with LOD of at least 10
4 target copies per test should
be achieved. In the case of a negative result, the primers for that
particular target were replaced and the modified cocktail was
retested.
Analytic sensitivity validation
Since only a few of the targeted biothreat agents can be obtained
and processed in a BSL2 laboratory, efforts using natural genomic
templates to demonstrate LOD for a majority of the targets on
RPM-TEI chip were constrained. To validate the RPM-TEI assay’s
full capabilities for biothreat agent detection, artificially generated
gene fragments (546–1200 bp) were used as an alternate means to
estimate platform LOD (supporting Table S3).
The final sensitivity testing was conducted in two stages. First,
samples containing mixed templates at 10
4 copies per assay were
prepared (for mix compositions see supporting Table S4) and run
on microarrays. Templates for which detection at 10
4 was not
achieved were retested at 10
6 copies per sample. The results of the
sensitivity testing are summarized in Table 3 and the detailed
results for each target are listed in supporting Table S2. It was
found that 129 out of 187 test target templates (69%) were
detected at 10
4 copies, and 47 (25%) were detected at 10
6 copies,
while only 11 targets (6%) were found to have a LOD higher than
10
6 template copies. Since most pathogens have two or more gene
targets represented on the microarray and detection of any single
target for a particular pathogen is all that is required for its
successful detection, approximately 80% (66 out of 84) of the
pathogens can be detected at 10
4 genome copies. Remaining
pathogens, with the single exception of Cryptosporidium parvum were
found to achieve a limit of detection of 10
6 copies.
Testing with whole genome templates of selected
viruses
The performance of RPM-TEI was tested using a number of
whole genome preparations of viruses to compare with validation
results using synthetic templates. Due to ‘‘select agent’’ status of
pathogens from which these genomic nucleic acid preparations
were obtained, the experiments were conducted in the Virology
Division of USAMRIID (Ft. Detrick, Frederick, MD). For the list
of agents and detailed results see Table 2.
Initially four distinct viruses (Ebola Zaire, Ebola Reston, Lassa
Josiah and Lassa Z148) each of them in four 10-fold dilutions (from
1n gt o1 0
23 ng per microarray) were used to test the specificity and
sensitivity of the RPM-TEI. It was estimated that 1 ng genomic
RNAcorrespondstoapproximately10
5 pfu,basedontitrationincell
culture. The microarray consistently provided correct detection and
identification of these viruses, except for Lassa Josiah at the lowest
tested concentration, which was only slightly below the detection
threshold. Subsequently, further 10-fold serial dilutions of Ebola
Zaire virus, to 10
25 ng, were used to assess the practical LOD. The
results showed that LOD for genomic RNA preparation of this virus
was between 10 and 1 pfu. These results indicate that establishing
LOD with synthetic template is a valid alternative if genomic
materials cannot be obtained.
In addition, several agents belonging to PCR group II through
IV (most of the PCR group I targets were previously tested using
genomic nucleic acid templates at NRL) were also tested. The
testing was conducted using total genomic nucleic acids of 22
different viral agents in addition to the four initially tested. The
viral template preparations used were at 0.1 ng per sample.
The RPM-TEI microarray was able to successfully detect the
majority of viruses across all three tested groups. Most of the
positively identified samples were correctly identified to the strain
level. In addition, the microarrays were able to discriminate
between closely related viral strains in a number of cases. RPM-
TEI was able to distinguish between Zaire 1995 and Zaire
Mayinga strains of Ebola virus, and correctly differentiated
between Machupo virus strains Carvallo and Chicava. When
testing several strains of Lassa viruses, correct unambiguous
identifications were made for three distinct strains, Josiah, Z148
and Weller. In the case of Lassa virus Pinneo strain, the RPM-TEI
identification narrowed it down to being one of two strains, Pinneo
and Acar.
Of 26 agents tested in this series of experiments, 6 returned
negative results. One of the negative samples was expected, since
Puumala virus (a species of Hantavirus) was not represented on the
chip. In the remaining five cases (Marburg Musoke, Lassa Acar,
two Sandfly fever viruses: Sicilian and Punta Toro as well as
Hantaan virus), the quality of the RNA preparation was
considered to be the most likely explanation for the lack of
detected agent sequence(s). At the time these experiments were
conducted no other preparations of these agents were available.
Discussion
This study demonstrates that RPM-TEI platform is able to
achieve highly specific and sensitive detection of multiple biothreat
agents in a single test. In contrast to contemporary methods used
for microbial diagnostics and surveillance, RPM technology
supports simultaneous detection and differential identification of
hundreds of targets in a single diagnostic run. In addition, the
resulting sequence information can be used to assess pathogenicity,
mutations, virulence markers, and to differentiate detected agents
from closely related species. This detailed information on the
detected infectious agent may be invaluable for recognizing the
Table 3. Summarized results of RPM-TEI sensitivity testing.
PCR group LOD
1 at 10
4 LOD at 10
6 LOD.10
6 Total
I 28 (15) 16 (5) 5 (0) 49 (20)
II 32 (12) 12 (2) 0 (0) 44 (14)
III 42 (18) 1 (0) 1 (0) 44 (18)
IV 27 (21) 18 (10) 5 (1) 50 (32)
Total 129 (66) 47 (17) 11 (1) 187 (84)
1LOD=limit of detection. The results refer to the number of targets with
particular LOD. The results in parentheses refer to number of pathogens
detected with particular LOD.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006569.t003
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management/exposure response planning.
Selection of diagnostic marker gene sequences as RPM
detectors to be tiled on the microarray is critical to assay
sensitivity and specificity. In the case of bacterial pathogens, it is
relatively straightforward to find targets that cover all variants of
the species. However, it is more difficult to ensure discrimination
from near neighbor species so multiple targets are usually required
(supporting Table S1).
For viruses, especially RNA viruses, the highly variable nature
of their genomes warranted a multistage design process to select a
minimal number of sequences for the detection and differential
identification of known strains developed previously [20,29]. The
same strategy with some further modification was used when
designing RPM-TEI. Testing of the RPM-TEI microarray
conducted with several strains of different viral agents confirmed
the general validity of this approach. The sequence information
obtained in the testing process enabled very precise strain level
identifications in many cases. We were able to discriminate
between two Ebola Zaire strains (Zaire 1995 and Zaire Mayinga),
whose genomes differ only by 2% on the nucleotide level and 0.6%
on the protein level. Similar strain discrimination was obtained in
case of Machupo virus strains Carvallo and Chicava [30]
(sequence identity at 97% for segment S and 96% for segment
L). Lassa virus is another excellent example of this capability. Out
of 5 tested Lassa strains 3 were unambiguously identified to the
strain level. In the case of Lassa Pinneo, strain identification could
only be narrowed down to two possible strains Acar and Pinneo
because their S genome segments (3.5 kb total length) differ by
only 3 nucleotide changes, and these nucleotides are not
represented by the probes used on the RPM-TEI array.
One of the most noteworthy and innovative parts of this work is
the approach to the sensitivity testing of the microarray. Due to
restricted access to the ‘‘select agents’’ that the microarray was
designed to detect, a library of 142, plasmid-embedded synthetic
target DNA fragments was used to conduct the analytical testing
for most of the viral agents. This method of testing enabled us to
carry out all of the validation experiments in a BSL2 laboratory.
These sensitivity validation experiments differed from real world
testing situations in a number of ways: they used DNA instead of
RNA (majority of viral agents detected by RPM-TEI are RNA
viruses) and the test templates contained isolated target sequences
outside of the whole genome context. However, the aforemen-
tioned confirmatory experiments with full-length viral RNA
genomic preparations have shown that this novel strategy is a
suitable alternative for sensitivity validation purposes. Our
previous experience with respiratory organisms has indicated that
a LOD ,10
4 copies for the sensitivity validations provides the
required detection sensitivity in real world clinical samples ,10
pfu [19]. The results of this work indicate that LOD at ,10
4
copies using synthetic templates correlates with 10 pfu or less of
the full length viral genomic preparations which we believe is the
required target LOD of sensitivity validations. It remains for a
complete study of clinical and environmental samples using the
RPM-TEI and integration of clinical and epidemiological data
before the performance will be fully established.
While the RPM chips demonstrate an excellent detection
sensitivity and specificity for the majority of the targets, a few
pathogens and toxin gene targets were detected with lower
sensitivities. This was most likely caused by inefficient amplification
at the multiplex PCR stage of detection. The primer selection
process and amplification procedures for RPM-TEI are designed to
minimize the impact of primer integrity, primer stability, and
sample stability on detection capability but these can never be
completely alleviated. Due to constraints on primer design resulting
from the high level of multiplexing, it is unavoidable that there will
be variable levels of amplification for different targets. A greater
level of variability can be tolerated due to the RPM detection
process but when it is too great it may lower sensitivity. In addition,
mutations of target sequences are always a possibility that may
reduce the efficiency of primer-binding sites resulting in inefficient
amplification and detection failure. Furthermore, like all other
molecular detection methods, the sensitivity of this assay is also
dependent on the quality of front-end sample processing. Problems
with sample preparation and/or storage may have contributed to
the lack of identification of the 6 viral RNA preparations tested at
0.1 ng. The detection failure in a few of those cases was most likely
the result of insufficient sample quality.
There are also limitations specific to the RPM technology that
have been extensively discussed previously [18]. Chiefly, the
limited space available on the microarrays requires making
tradeoffs between breadth and depth of target coverage. This
problem may be alleviated in future with availability of
microarrays with greater densities.
Finally, itshould be noted that although the listof targets included
on the RPM-TEI chip was selected to maximize detection of agents
important from a biodefense perspective, many of these pathogens
are also known to be endemic in certain regions such as Central
Africa for hemorrhagic fevers caused by filoviruses [31] or South
America for hemorrhagic fevers caused by arenaviruses [32] and
Dengue viruses [33]. For this reason the RPM-TEI assay may prove
useful for diagnostics and epidemiologic investigations in the regions
of the world affected by these agents. The sequence information
generated from the RPM in conjunction with previously developed
sequence analysis algorithm CIBSI can be easily interpreted to make
serotype or strain identifications. This feature, the platform’s high
resolution, high throughput, and relatively modest cost per single
detected pathogen provide support for use of the RPM-TEI as a
diagnostic and surveillance tool in regional reference laboratories.
Efforts continue to test the utility of this assay using samples having
more diverse biological origins and pathogen content.
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